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ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING AND DECEPTIVE
CAMPAIGN TACTICS: POLICY ISSUES
Nichole Rustin-Paschal*
This Essay examines a set of emerging problems in election law—the increased
use of online behavioral advertising to target voters, the failure of the law to address
deceptive campaign tactics, and the convergence of these two issues in an Internet-
based society.1  The Essay begins with a discussion of voter suppression and deceptive
campaign tactics in the context of behavioral advertising.  Part II examines the law
surrounding voter fraud, intimidation, and suppression, finding that there is a lack
of attention to penalizing voter suppression, particularly at the federal level.  Though
there are some laws at the state level, more can be done.  The Essay concludes by
examining, in Part III, how political campaigns have put behavioral advertising to
use and offers recommendations for moving forward.
I. ONLINE BEHAVIORAL TRACKING AND THE POTENTIAL FOR VOTER SUPPRESSION
On July 31, 2010, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) began a series investigating
how much information advertisers are able to gather about Internet users.2  The study
found, among other things, that “cookies” are no longer the only method for tracking
consumers, the profiles compiled from the tracking data are continually refreshed,
providing advertisers with a constant stream of data to be bought and sold, and that
the tracking technologies used by companies are often never brought to the attention
of consumers.3  Tracking consumers led advertisers, according to the WSJ, to spend
twenty-three billion dollars in the previous year.4  The specificity of the profiles cre-
ated by advertisers is so exact, that one consumer, confronted with her online profile,
commented that it was “unnerving.”5
* Ph.D. (American Studies, New York University, 1999), J.D. (University of Virginia,
2010); EPIC Open Government Fellow. William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal Symposium:
Privacy, Democracy, and Elections, October 22, 2010.
1 This Essay is drawn from my work on the Electronic Privacy Information Center’s
2010 report: ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., E-DECEPTIVE CAMPAIGN PRACTICES REPORT 2010:
INTERNET TECHNOLOGY AND DEMOCRACY 2.0 (Nichole Rustin-Pascal & Sharon Gott Nissim
eds. Oct. 2010) [hereinafter E-DECEPTIVE] . The full report, including recommendations on
defending against e-deceptive campaign attacks, can be found at http://epic.org/privacy/voting
/E_Deceptive_Report_10_2010.pdf.
2 See Julia Angwin, The Web’s New Gold Mine: Your Secrets, WALL ST. J., July 31–Aug. 1,
2010 (Weekend Magazine), at W1.
3 Id.
4 Id. at W2.
5 Id.
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The comments about the WSJ story fall into four broad categories—those who
find that the WSJ story serves only to stoke the flames of paranoia surrounding threats
to privacy,6 to others finding that people should take the initiative to be more informed
about how to protect themselves from privacy invasive technologies,7 to those who
believe that tracking is the quid pro quo for free content,8 to those who are grateful
for the information provided because, though they may be sophisticated readers and
consumers, they may not be as technologically literate as they would prefer.9  Overlay-
ing most of the comments is an awareness that privacy is at risk when people interact
on the Internet.10
Indeed, that last category of users is precisely the group that concerned Senator
John D. (Jay) Rockefeller (D-W.Va.) in a July 2010 hearing by the Committee on Com-
merce Science & Transportation on Online Consumer Privacy.11  Before presenting
6 Brandon Adkins wrote, “WSJ, this is one of the most alarmist pieces I’ve seen from you.
This article extremely overstates the privacy issues surrounding cookies. Cookies have been
around . . . oh . . . 10–15 years? Stop acting like you discovered them. Such blatant ignorance.”
Brandon Adkins, Comment to The Web’s New Gold Mine: Your Secrets, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7,
2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703940904575395073512989404.html.
7 William Drose wrote:
I very much disagree that cleaning cookies/temp files is a hassle, I’ve
done it for years as I browse and it’s second nature. Anyone who uses
technology of any sort knows maintenance pays dividends. . . .
Learn your temp folders and get them wired, whatever OS you use. Then
teach all of your friends.
William Drose, Comment to The Web’s New Gold Mine: Your Secrets, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 1,
2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703940904575395073512989404.html.
8 Walt Kowalski wrote, “By blocking cookies you block the ability of your favorite content
providers to make money. Let’s face it—you are not going to pay for that subscription.” Walt
Kowalski, Comment to The Web’s New Gold Mine: Your Secrets, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 1, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703940904575395073512989404.html.
9 Susan Thomas wrote, “I can’t change the past. But going forward, I think this inspires
me to quell mindless internet surfing. . . . This article is good incentive to carry out a larger
percentage of my life offline.” Susan Thomas, Comment to The Web’s New Gold Mine: Your
Secrets, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703
940904575395073512989404.html.
10 See Comments to The Web’s New Gold Mine: Your Secrets, WALL ST. J. (July 31–
Aug. 7, 2010).
11 See Elizabeth Montalbano, Google, Facebook, Apple Face Privacy Questions From
Senators, INFORMATIONWEEK (July 28, 2010, 3:04 PM), http://www.informationweek.com
/news/government/security/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=226300182; see also Consumer Online
Privacy Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Trans., 111th Cong. (2010)
[hereinafter Hearing, Rockefeller] (statement of John D. Rockefeller IV, Chairman), available
at http://commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=Hearings&ContentRecord_id=0bfb9dfc
-bbd7-40d6-8467-3b3344c72235&Statement_id=21f3326d-345f-4aaa-b105-0532997b481e
&ContentType_id=14f995b9-dfa5-407a-9d35-56cc7152a7ed&Group_id=b06c39af-e033
-4cba-9221-de668ca1978a&MonthDisplay=7&YearDisplay=2010.
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the panel with several questions, Senator Rockefeller described a world in which indi-
viduals are continually tracked as they conduct their daily business—information about
books purchased and read, stores entered and products bought, prescriptions filled
and shampoos chosen becomes revenue generating data.12  The businesses collecting
this data use it to then build a “personality profile” on the user, predicting future pur-
chases, intellectual interests, and medical issues.13  Though it may seem “fantastic,”
Senator Rockefeller stated, the truth is that computers are doing this type of extensive
profiling on consumers to provide targeted advertising.14  Though the advertising
might be useful, the data used to compile a portrait of the perfect ad could also be used
to design a scam directed at a specific user.15  Senator Rockefeller asked the witness
several questions about the notice consumers have about these practices which track
consumers online, while they walk public streets, how much of their personal infor-
mation is being shared with third parties, what benefits consumers get from this track-
ing, and what recourse they have to demand greater anonymity from advertisers.16
Senator Rockefeller concluded his opening statement with several poignant ex-
amples of the users whose welfare he thought was being threatened by the increased
use of online behavioral tracking:
I am talking about ordinary Internet users. I am talking about a
55-year-old coal miner in West Virginia who sends an email to his
son in college.  I’m talking about a 30-year-old mother who uses
her broadband connection to research the best doctor she can take
her sick toddler to see.  I’m talking about a 65-year-old man who
just signed up for a Facebook account so he can view photos of
his grandson, and reconnect with old friends.17
The value of this story to a discussion of e-deceptive campaign tactics is princi-
pally drawing our attention as advocates to the reality that consumers are not equally
situated when it comes to threats to voter participation.  Unsavvy users compose one
group for whom e-deceptive campaign practices are a concern.  If they are unaware
that their online behavior is being tracked (and consequently do not have the knowl-
edge of how to limit that tracking), then they may be susceptible to campaigns which
can aggregate information and direct information at them in a way that will discourage
their participation in the voting process.
12 Hearing, Rockefeller, supra note 11.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
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As Gilda Daniels has noted, voter deception has an “amorphous and arguably
ambiguous definition,”18 which few scholars and lawmakers have grappled with
substantively.19  Fraud20 and intimidation21 remain the primary focus of the law.22  The
Election Assistance Commission (EAC), Daniels explains, usefully defines election
crimes, but only in ways that “tangentially include[ ] deceptive acts.”23  Daniels views
voter deception as similar to fraud and intimidation, but also quite distinct from them.24
In a report the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) published on e-
deceptive campaign practices, EPIC explained:
Deceptive campaigns are attempts to misdirect targeted voters re-
garding the voting process or in some way affect their willingness
to cast a vote.  Deceptive election activities include false state-
ments about poll place opening and closing times, the date of the
election, voter identification rules, or the eligibility requirements
for voters who wish to cast a ballot.25
The rate of deceptive campaign practices surrounding federal elections has been in-
creasing since the 2000 election.26  In 2004, Election Protection reported over 1,000
complaints about deceptive practices and voter suppression tactics.27
18 Gilda R. Daniels, Voter Deception, 43 IND. L. REV. 343, 355 (2010).
19 See, e.g., Jordan T. Stringer, Comment, Criminalizing Voter Suppression: The Necessity
of Restoring Legitimacy in Federal Elections and Reversing Disillusionment in Minority
Communities, 57 EMORY L.J. 1011, 1011–15 (2008).
20 See CRAIG C. DONSANTO & NANCY L. SIMMONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL
PROSECUTION OF ELECTION OFFENSES 24 (7th ed. 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov
/criminal/pin/docs/electbook-0507.pdf (“Election fraud involves a substantive irregularity
relating to the voting act—such as bribery, intimidation, or forgery—which has the potential
to taint the election itself.”).
21 See 42 U.S.C. § 1971(b) (2006). Voter intimidation can include threats, force, or inter-
ference in the voting process making voters afraid to exercise their right to vote. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 594 (2006).
22 See Daniels, supra note 18, at 361; A. David Pardo, Election Law Violations, 45 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 305, 310–29 (2008) (discussing the statutes that govern voter intimidation and
voter fraud).
23 Daniels, supra note 18, at 355.
24 Id.
25 E-DECEPTIVE, supra note 1, at 4.
26 Daniels, supra note 18, at 353; see also Tova Andrea Wang, 2004: A Report Card, in
Special Report: Democracy at Risk, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 1, 2005, at A4, A7 (describing de-
ceptive actions in Ohio, including falsely informing newly registered voters that if the NAACP
or the John Kerry presidential campaign had registered them, they would be ineligible to vote).
27 ELECTION PROT., SHATTERING THE MYTH: AN INITIAL SNAPSHOT OF VOTER DISEN-
FRANCHISEMENT IN THE 2004 ELECTIONS 7 (2004), available at http://www.866ourvote
.org/tools/publications_testimony/files/0002.pdf.
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Studies have suggested that deceptive campaigns target voters who are likely to
vote, but may be swayed by activity, such as robo-calls or misinformation campaigns,
not to vote.28  Voters may be most susceptible to such tactics during elections that are
highly contested.29  Highly contested elections provide a context for pulling in voters
who normally do not vote regularly, and potentially discouraging likely voters who
find the tenor of a campaign season difficult.  Consider the 2008 election when then
Senator Barack Obama (D-IL) stood as the Democratic candidate for president.  As the
first viable African American presidential candidate, Obama attracted a huge African
American following.30  It is well established that African Americans often vote for
democratic candidates31—since the likelihood of black voters not voting for Obama
was so great, deceptive campaigns targeting them, particularly black women who rep-
resented for the first time the highest participation of any voting block,32 would have
been reasonable.  The goal would have been to keep these voters away from the polls
in order to affect the election results.  But at the close of polls, researchers found that
95% of black voters voted for Obama.33
Suppression campaigns that target African-American voters will likely impact
their participation in the electoral process by intimidating them from exercising a con-
stitutional right by affecting their confidence in the electoral process.  Suppression
campaigns can also affect the success of a party at the polls during a highly contested
election.34  Exercising the right to vote evinces an individual’s or a group’s stake in
fully participating in our democracy as citizens.35  Suppression tactics effectively
turn that desire to participate into skepticism about an individual’s or group’s value in
the democratic process.36  As Jordan Stringer writes, “[T]he voting system becomes
28 See E-DECEPTIVE, supra note 1, at 9.
29 See id. at 4.
30 See Claire Cohen, Breakdown of Demographics Reveals How Black Voters Swept
Obama into White House, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 5, 2008, 6:33 PM) http://www.dailymail.co
.uk/news/worldnews/article-1083335/Breakdown-demographics-reveals-black-voters-swept
-Obama-White-House.html.
31 See PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, THE 2004 POLITICAL
LANDSCAPE: EVENLY DIVIDED AND INCREASINGLY POLARIZED 6 (2003), available at http://
people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/196.pdf (“Compared with other demographic groups, African
Americans are by far the strongest supporters of the Democratic party.”).
32 MARK HUGO LOPEZ & PAUL TAYLOR, PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE
PRESS, DISSECTING THE 2008 ELECTORATE: MOST DIVERSE IN U.S. HISTORY 5 (2009),
available at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1209/racial-ethnic-voters-presidential-election.
33 Cohen, supra note 30.
34 See Sherry A. Swirsky, Minority Voter Intimidation: The Problem That Won’t Go Away,
11 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 359, 360 (2002) (noting that voter intimidation efforts
“exploit a political culture in which participation by minority, poor and uneducated voters
too often has been devalued, even by these voters themselves”).
35 Stringer, supra note 19, at 1021.
36 See id.
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corrupted not only when laws are repeatedly broken but also when voters perceive
that they are being victimized by a voting system that is vulnerable to coercive and
discriminatory effects.”37
The primary targets for voter suppression have typically been members of low-
income, racial and language minorities, young first-time voters, the disabled, and the
elderly.38  Campaigns which target these communities develop messages that play on
their insecurities.  For example, people who are undergoing foreclosures may believe
deceptive campaign strategies that claim these people are ineligible to vote.39  This is
not the case.40  Another regularly used tactic is asserting the need to protect against
voter fraud.41  Statistically, voter fraud almost never occurs but, as a scare tactic, it
does provide a way to galvanize voters and poll workers to “protect” the integrity of
the process.42  Poll workers might challenge the eligibility of language-minority voters
because of fears about who may be voting.43  The result might be the turning away of
eligible voters.44  Tova Wang has described this “ginning up [the] bogeyman” of voter
fraud as a way to “intimidate certain groups of voters and, ultimately, make it harder
for minority or disadvantaged groups to exercise their right to vote.  It is no accident
that these operations have repeatedly focused on minority communities.”45
Consider some of the following attempts at suppressing minority voter partici-
pation.  They range from circulating fraudulent ballots,46 to directing robo-calls
37 Id.
38 See, e.g., BRIAN FREEMAN ET AL., VOTER SUPPRESSION: NEW HAMPSHIRE’S RESPONSE
TO A NATIONAL PROBLEM 5–7 (2009), available at http://rockefeller.dartmouth.edu/shop
/PRS Policy Brief 0809-02.pdf. For a discussion of how voter intimidation tactics are rooted
in the racial and class based efforts to limit the vote see TRACY CAMPBELL, DELIVER THE VOTE:
A HISTORY OF ELECTION FRAUD, AN AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION, 1742–2004, at
133–34 (2005); ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 258–59 (2000); NAT’L COMM’N ON THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT, PROTECTING MINORITY VOTERS: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AT WORK 1982–2005, at
307–10 (2006), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ngos/lccr2.pdf;
PEOPLE FOR THE AM. WAY FOUND., THE LONG SHADOW OF JIM CROW: VOTER INTIMIDATION
AND SUPPRESSION IN AMERICA TODAY (2004), available at http://www.pfaw.org/sites/default
/files/thelongshadowofjimcrow.pdf.
39 E-DECEPTIVE, supra note 1, at 4.
40 See id.
41 See generally JUSTIN LEVITT, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE TRUTH ABOUT VOTER
FRAUD (2007), available at http://www.truthaboutfraud.org/pdf/TruthAboutVoterFraud.pdf.
42 Tova Andrea Wang, Voter Fraud Hysteria, POLITICO (Nov. 1, 2010 10:17 AM), http://
www.politico.com/news/stories/1110/44478.html.
43 See id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 See, e.g., News Release, Maryland Attorney General’s Office, Attorney General Gansler
Obtains Restraining Order to Halt Distribution of Fraudulent Campaign Ballot, (Sept. 7, 2010),
http://www.oag.state.md.us/Press/2010/090710.htm; see also E-DECEPTIVE, supra note 1, at 11.
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announcing faulty voter registration information to primarily African-American
households,47 to distributing campaign fliers with altered images and misrepresen-
tations of the policy positions of a candidate to his targeted voters.48
Deceptive campaigns often adapt to and follow the technologies available to
them.  In an increasingly information-based society, deceptive campaigns will likely
be launched in ways that take advantage of tools provided by web-based technologies
for communicating and organizing.49  The challenge will be identifying the perpetrators
of the campaigns.  EPIC identified how computer fraud practices such as “spoofing,”
“phishing,” “pharming,” “denial of service,” “rumor mongering,” and “social engi-
neering,” could be used in deceptive campaigns.50  These tactics rely on voters being
unsophisticated computer and Internet users who may have difficulty distinguishing
between genuine and fraudulent Internet communications.
During an election period, voters may turn to search engines, social networking
sites, and websites to get information about candidates and the issues.51  Deceptive cam-
paigns could, for example, create websites that misuse government insignia and pro-
vide unknowing voters wrong information about registration requirements or polling
locations.52  Alternatively, legitimate sites may be compromised by campaigns that try
to overload the system through denial of service attacks, leaving voters without access
to important and timely election information.53  The threat of malware or phishing
emails or the exposure of personally identifiable information to identity thieves may
discourage voters from participating in organizing efforts or even voting.54
II. THE LEGAL CHALLENGES OF INTERNET ENABLED POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
The decentralized and open nature of the Internet makes it central to contemporary
efforts to organize and educate voters.55  At least 24% of Americans turned to the
47 Bniolet, Elections Board Hunting Robocaller, NEWS OBSERVER (Apr. 28, 2008, 4:45
PM), http://projects.newsobserver.com/under_the_dome/elections_board_hunting_robocaller;
see also E-DECEPTIVE, supra note 1, at 12.
48 Deirdre Fernandes, Oberndorf Campaign Files Complaint on Sessoms-Obama Flier,
VIRGINIAN-PILOT ( Nov. 29, 2008), http://hamptonroads.com/2008/11/oberndorf-campaign
-files-complaint-sessomsobama-flier; Alex Koppelman, Voter Suppression in North Carolina?,
SALON (May 2, 2008, 4:46 PM), http://www.salon.com/politics/war_room/2008/05/02/
robocalls; see also E-DECEPTIVE, supra note 1, at 12.
49 E-DECEPTIVE, supra note 1, at 12–16.
50 Id. at 14–15.
51 Id. at 16–17.
52 Id. at 17.
53 Id. at 18–19.
54 Id. at 15.
55 Internet Communications, 71 Fed. Reg. 18,589, 18,590–91 (Apr. 12, 2006) (to be codi-
fied at 11 C.F.R. pts. 100, 110, 114); Misha Glenny, Who Controls the Internet, FINANCIAL
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Internet for information in the 2008 Presidential election.56  Voters can access the
Internet from smart phones and other smart devices such as the iPad, as well from desk-
top and laptop computers.57  Information can be disseminated via blogs, texts, tweets,
mobile ads and web pages.  With over 74% of American adults using the Internet,58
(many of them from mobile devices)59 information is portable and easily accessible.
These forms of communication serve not only to bring people together, but to
launch deceptive campaigns.  Robo-calls, for instance, take advantage of new web-
based technology to barrage voters with automated political messages which can be
used to misdirect voters.60  In 2006, voters in Missouri, Virginia, Arizona, and Mary-
land reported receiving numerous robo-calls falsely informing them that, among other
things, their polling places had changed and that their registrations were cancelled
making them ineligible to vote.61
Because of the fluid and decentralized nature of the Internet, enforcement of laws
regulating political activity face a number of challenges.  Federal and state laws are not
easily mapped onto Internet communications.  New strategies are needed to address
the gaps.  Campaign finance laws, for example, are beginning to be adapted to reflect
the limitations of Internet advertising.  Florida has recently updated its laws related to
political advertising.62  Prior to the change, Florida state law required that candidates
disclose within the ad that it is a political ad, the source paying for the ad, whether the
candidate approved the ad, and the office being sought by the candidate.63  An ad
placed in a traditional print medium would provide sufficient space for all of this infor-
mation.  However, Internet-based ads may not.  For example, a St. Petersburg mayoral
TIMES (Oct. 8, 2010, 11:40 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/3e52897c-d0ee-11df-a426-0014
4feabdc0.html.
56 PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, SOCIAL NETWORKING AND ONLINE
VIDEOS TAKE OFF: INTERNET’S BROADER ROLE IN CAMPAIGN 2008, at 21 (2008), available
at http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2008/The-Internet-Gains-in-Politics/Summary-of
-Findings.aspx.
57 E-DECEPTIVE, supra note 1, at 16.
58 AARON SMITH, PEW INTERNET &AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, THE INTERNET’S ROLE IN
CAMPAIGN 2008 (Apr. 15, 2009), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2009 /6--
The-Internets-Role-in-Campaign-2008.aspx.
59 LEE RAINIE, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, INTERNET BROADBAND AND
CELL PHONE STATISTICS (2010), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Internet
-broadband-and-cell-phone-statistics.aspx.
60 See Charles Babington & Alec MacGillis, It’s a Candidate Calling. Again. Republicans
Deny Subterfuge as Phone Barrages Anger Voters, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2006, at A8.
61 ROBIN CARNAHAN, VOTERS FIRST: AN EXAMINATION OF THE 2006 MIDTERM ELECTION
IN MISSOURI 17 (2007), http://www.sos.mo.gov/elections/VotersFirst/2006/VoterFirst-Complete
.pdf; Deborah Barfield Berry, Dems To Target Political ‘Robo Calls,’ USA TODAY (Nov. 11,
2006, 9:21 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-11-20-dems-robo-calls
_x.htm.
62 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 106.143 (West 2010).
63 See E-DECEPTIVE, supra note 1, at 12.
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candidate, Scott Wagman, turned to Google Adwords to advertise his 2009 campaign.64 
Google Adwords links ads and keywords so that a particular ad will appear whenever
a search is run using those terms.65  Wagman linked his ad to search terms including
his opponents’ names.66  Wagman was charged with violating Florida’s campaign
finance laws because the full disclosure was not included in the character-limited
Google ad.67  The lawsuit was thrown out eventually.68  However, the real result was
the Florida legislature amending its disclosure requirement to account for the special
context of online advertising.69
The efficiency of the early Internet, with its small number of users,70 did not re-
quire much attention to be spent on its security features nor on tight administration of
communication flows.  The decentralized nature of the Internet, with fluid national and
state borders, means that creating laws to govern the Internet remains fraught with
numerous tensions.71  In the context of administering elections, ensuring that eligible
voters participate, and policing voter suppression techniques are even more difficult. 
“The enforcement of campaign regulations regarding political mail and telephone com-
munications would likely be very intrusive in cyberspace unless designed carefully and
supported by the active participation of users, nonprofits, governments, and commer-
cial interests.”72  Helping voters get redress against online deceptive campaigns is
a difficult task.  While voter intimidation has been penalized under the Hatch Act,73 
64 Id. at 12–13.
65 Id. at 12.
66 See Christina Silva, Scott Wagman to Fight Online Ad Complaint in a Case That Could
Set Precedent, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Aug. 11, 2009), available at http://www.tampabay
.com/news/politics/KYC/scott-wagman-to-fight-online-ad-complaint-in-a-case-that-could
-set/1026451; Internet Campaigning, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://
www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=21244 (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
67 E-DECEPTIVE, supra note 1, at 13.
68 Id.
69 See Kate Kaye, Florida’s New Political Ad Law Could Drive Dollars from State
Candidates Online, CLICKZ (June 2, 2010), http://www.clickz.com/clickz/news/1726249
/floridas-new-political-ad-law-could-drive-dollars-state-candidates-online; see also, Internet
Campaigning, supra note 66.
70 Factsheet: A Brief History of NSF and the Internet, NAT’L SCI. FOUND. (Aug. 13, 2003),
http://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=103050; see also Barry M. Leiner et al.,
A Brief History of the Internet, INTERNET SOCIETY, http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief
.shtml (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
71 JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET: ILLUSIONS OF A
BORDERLESS WORLD, at viii (2006).
72 E-DECEPTIVE, supra note 1, at 13–14; see also Cybersecurity Privacy, Practical
Implications, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR, http://epic.org/privacy/cybersecurity/default.html
(last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
73 The Hatch Act makes it illegal to intimidate voters in federal elections to:
[I]ntimidate[ ], threaten[ ], coerce[ ] or attempt[ ] to intimidate, threaten
or coerce any other person for the purpose of interfering with the right
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there is no federal law making deceptive tactics illegal.74  Though some steps have
been taken to enact legislation addressing this gap in election law, they have ulti-
mately been unsuccessful.
In the 110th Congress, then Senator Barack Obama (D-IL) and Senator Charles
Schumer (D-NY) introduced the Deceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention
Act of 2007 which would have criminalized voter deception and increased, for those
convicted of voter intimidation, the sentence served from one year to five years or a
fine of $100,000, or both.75  Additionally, the bill provided that private parties could
initiate suits in court and required that the Attorney General’s office investigate alle-
gations of voter deception.76  The Attorney General had the additional burden of cor-
recting information for voters who were affected by the deceptive campaign tactic,
referring any matter under the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Civil Rights Division
to appropriate authorities for prosecution, and referring the case to federal or state
authorities for prosecution after the election.77  The bill prohibited providing misin-
formation about election times, voter qualifications, voter registration status, political
endorsements, and criminal penalties associated with voting.78
Following the failure of that bill to move ahead, Representative John Conyers
(D-MI) introduced a bill, H.R. 97, in the 111th Congress to address the gap in election
protection law.79  The bill would have required the Attorney General, after determin-
ing that there was a reasonable basis to find the occurrence of deceptive practices, to
“undertake all effective measures necessary to provide correct information to voters
affected by the false information” and to refer all credible allegations to the DOJ’s
Civil Rights Division and to other federal and state authorities for criminal prosecution
or civil action post election.80  The bill also would have required that the Attorney
of such other person to vote or to vote as he may choose, or of causing
such other person to vote for, or not to vote for, any candidate for the
office of President, Vice-President, Presidential elector, Member of the
Senate, member of the House of Representatives . . . at any election held
solely or in part for the purpose of electing such candidate, shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 594 (2006).
74 For further discussion of election law offenses and statutes, see David Pardo, Election
Law Violations, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 305, 307 (2008); David C. Rothschild & Benjamin
J. Wolinsky, Election Law Violations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 391 (2009).
75 Deceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation Act of 2007, S. 453, 110th Cong. §§ 1, 3; see
also Stringer, supra note 19, at 1042–43; Seth Stern, Obama-Schumer Bill Proposal Would
Criminalize Voter Intimidation, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/cq/2007
/01/31/cq_2213.html.
76 Deceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation Act of 2007, S. 453, 110th Cong. § 4.
77 Id. § (4)(b)(1).
78 Id. § (3)(a)(2)(C).
79 Deceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation Act of 2009, H.R.97, 111th Cong.
80 Id. § 5(b)(1)(A).
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General consult with a variety of experts, including voting rights groups, local election
officials, and civil rights groups when promulgating rules defining the provision of
correct information to voters.81  However, with the 2010 mid-term elections, a new
Congress will be sworn in, requiring that a bill like H.R. 97 be reintroduced.
The Civil Rights Act of 1957 created the Civil Rights Division of the DOJ and
authorized it to sue on behalf of black Americans who were being harassed and denied
their right to vote.82  Subsequent enforcement of the Civil Rights Act was inconsistent. 
“[C]ourts reached different conclusions regarding its application to private individuals’
conduct, state elections, and enforcement by private litigants, effectively denying
adequate protection to intimidated voters.”83  Congress passed the Voting Rights Act
of 1965 (VRA) to address some of the enforcement flaws in the Civil Rights Act.84 
Although the Civil Rights Act provides that no one “shall intimidate, threaten, coerce,
or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any other person” by intending to obstruct
their right to vote,85 the VRA prohibits any “voting qualification or prerequisite to vot-
ing or standard, practice, or procedure . . . which results in a denial or abridgment of
the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.”86  The
VRA extends protections beyond elections involving federal candidates to include
elections in “any State, Territory, district, county, city, parish, township, school dis-
trict, municipality, or other territorial subdivision.”87  Nevertheless, the VRA has not
been as effective an enforcement mechanism as was hoped.88  Voter suppression in
the form of deceptive tactics remains an untouched violation for the DOJ.89
81 Id. § 5(b)(2).
82 Voting Rights Act Timeline, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.aclu.org/voting
-rights/voting-rights-act-timeline (last visited Apr. 10, 2011); Civil Rights Division, U.S. DEPT.
OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
83 Stringer, supra note 19, at 1023.
84 Id. at 1024.
85 42 U.S.C. § 1971(b) (2006).
86 Id. § 1973(a).
87 Id. § 1971(a)(1).
88 See Stringer, supra note 19, at 1024–25 (noting that the “‘flexible, fact-intensive test’
allowed courts to exercise considerable discretion” about whether an “invidious purpose”
motivated the suppression tactics, whether an invidious purpose was sufficient if there was no
showing of compelling discriminatory effects, and that the VRA left no remedies for plaintiffs);
see also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 628 n.10 (1982) (declining to address the VRA claim);
NAACP v. Gadsden Cnty. Sch. Bd., 691 F.2d 978, 981 n.4 (11th Cir. 1982) (resolving the case
on equal protection grounds and declining to address the VRA’s applicability); United States
v. Harvey, 250 F. Supp. 219, 237 (E.D. La. 1966) (finding that plaintiffs failed to prove their
claim under the VRA); Barbara Arnwine, Voting Rights at a Crossroads: Return to the Past
or an Opportunity for the Future, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 201, 303 (2005) (“This state of affairs
is especially shocking when one considers the hope that existed with the passage of the 1965
Voting Rights Act.”).
89 See DONSANTO & SIMMONS, supra note 20, at 61.
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The DOJ recognizes the significance of voter suppression and defines the elements
of voter suppression, even as it notes that there is no federal statute to prosecute voter
suppression: “Voter suppression schemes are designed to ensure the election of a fa-
vored candidate by blocking or impeding voters believed to oppose that candidate from
getting to the polls to cast their ballots.”90  The DOJ Criminal Division prosecutes elec-
tion offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 241 which makes it a felony to impede the exercise of
a right or privilege, such as voting, protected by the Constitution or United States law.91 
If the DOJ brings a case under this statute, it has the burden of proving a “specific intent
to violate constitutional rights.”92  Specific intent requires that the violation be the “pre-
dominant purpose” of the actions giving rise to the suit.93  The DOJ has not yet prose-
cuted a deceptive campaign under this statute, but has successfully prosecuted one party
official.94  The DOJ still has recourse to civil penalties under 42 U.S.C. § 1971(b)95
90 Id. The examples provided
include providing false information to the public—or a particular
segment of the public—regarding the qualifications to vote, the
consequences of voting in connection with citizenship status . . . the
date of an election, the hours for voting, or the correct voting precinct.
Another voter suppression scheme, attempted recently with partial
success, involved impeding access to voting by jamming the telephone
lines of entities offering rides to the polls in order to prevent voters
from requesting needed transportation.
Id.
91 See id. at 37–40 (discussing prosecutions under § 241). The language of the statute reads:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate
any person . . . in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege
secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or
because of his having so exercised the same . . .
. . .
They shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 241 (2006).
92 United States v. Ellis, 595 F.2d 154, 161–62 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing United States v. Guest,
383 U.S. 745, 753–54 (1966); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101 (1945)).
93 See Guest, 383 U.S. at 760.
94 See Daniels, supra note 18, at 362–63 (discussing United States v. Tobin, No. 04-CR
-216-01-SM, 2005 WL 3199672, at *1, *3 (D.N.H. Nov. 30, 2005)).
95 The statute reads:
No person, whether acting under color of law or otherwise, shall intimi-
date, threaten, coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, coerce any other
person for the purpose of interfering with the right of such other person
to vote or to vote as he may choose, or of causing such other person to
vote for, or not to vote for any candidate for the office of President, Vice
President, presidential elector, Member of the Senate, or Member of
the House of Representatives, Delegates, or Commissioners from the
Territories or possessions, at any general, special, or primary election
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and Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act.96  However, there has been little litigation
under these statutes.97
Some federal laws may be useful to reach cases in which federal election law has
been unsuccessful in combating deceptive campaigns. in.  The Phone Harassment
Statute prohibits the making of a telephone call or utilization of a telecommunications
device “whether or not conversation or communication ensues, without disclosing his
identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person at the called
number or who receives the communications.”98  Additionally, the Phone Harassment
Statute criminalizes activity that “makes or causes the telephone of another repeat-
edly or continuously to ring, with intent to harass any person at the called number.”99 
The federal mail-fraud statute criminalizes a “scheme or artifice to defraud” through
use of the mails to further the scheme and with the purpose of “obtaining money or
property.”100
Approximately thirty-nine states have, however, passed laws addressing deceptive
campaign tactics, such as distributing false information about election administration,
candidates or issues, a combination of both or interference with the voting process.101 
For example, Missouri’s 2006 law prohibits “Knowingly providing false information
about election procedures for the purpose of preventing any person from going to the
polls.”102  Arizona makes it unlawful to knowingly, by “fraudulent device or contriv-
ance whatever, to impede, prevent or otherwise interfere with the free exercise of the
elective franchise of any voter . . . .”103  Illinois makes it a felony if an individual or co-
conspirator “by force, intimidation, threat, deception or forgery, knowingly prevents
held solely or in part for the purpose of selecting or electing any such
candidate.
42 U.S.C. § 1971(b) (2006). Section 1971(c) authorizes the Attorney General to bring civil
actions for “preventive relief” against violations of § 1971. Id. § 1971(c).
96 This section reads:
No person, whether acting under color of law or otherwise, shall intimi-
date, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any
other person for voting or attempting to vote, or intimidate, threaten, or
coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for urging
or aiding any person to vote or attempt to vote, or intimidate . . . .
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 443 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1973i(b) (2006)).
97 See Daniels, supra note 18, at 359–61, 363–69.
98 See 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C) (2006).
99 Id. § 223(a)(1)(D).
100 See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006).
101 See Daniels, supra note 18, at 369.
102 MO. REV. STAT. § 115.631(26) (LexisNexis 2010); see also COMMON CAUSE & DEMOS,
VOTING IN 2010: TEN SWING STATES (2010), available at http://www.demos.org/swingstate/
2010swing_exec_FINAL.pdf.
103 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-1013(A)(2) (2010).
920 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 19:907
any person from . . . lawfully voting . . . .”104  Though the language in these state
statutes tends to be broad, the statutes do provide some measure of protection for
voters and should be used to combat deceptive campaign tactics.
Election protection efforts have focused on the ways that deceptive campaign
tactics used traditional mediums such as “telephone calls, ballot challenges, direct
mail, and canvass literature drops” to suppress the vote.105  These types of campaigns
required longer periods to be executed; Internet-based communications makes execu-
tion practically instantaneous, and seemingly under the guise of authoritative channels. 
The hacking of George Mason University’s Provost’s e-mail on Election Day 2008,
advising students that Election Day had been postponed,106 shows the ease with which
trusted networks can be compromised and become the source of suppression tactics.107
Some states have laws that address deceptive campaigns that use Internet-based
technologies to target a group for voter suppression.108  These laws could and should
be combined with other state statutes to effectively prosecute offenders, for example,
with voting rights laws, laws prohibiting false statements and deceptive practices, laws
prohibiting tampering with election or campaign materials, laws prohibiting the imper-
sonation of public officials, laws prohibiting the unauthorized use of state seals and
insignia, and anti-hacking and computer crime laws.109  Michigan, for example, has an
anti-hacking statute that makes it unlawful for a person to access a computer program,
computer, computer system, or computer network to “devise or execute a scheme or
artifice with the intent to defraud . . . .”110
III. PROFILING FOR VOTER SUPPRESSION
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) defines online behavioral advertising as
“the tracking of a consumer’s online activities over time—including the searches the
consumer has conducted, the web pages visited, and the content viewed—in order to
104 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/29-4 (LexisNexis 2011); see also id. § 5/29-18 (prohibiting
conspiracy to prevent voting). Other states with similar laws include Colorado, Kentucky,
Louisiana, and Nevada. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-13-713 (2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 119.155 (LexisNexis 2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1461(A)(6) (2010); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 293.710 (LexisNexis 2010). Further discussion can be found in COMMON CAUSE ET
AL., DECEPTIVE PRACTICES 2.0: LEGAL AND POLICY RESPONSES (2008), available at http://
www.commoncause.org/deceptivepracticesreport.pdf [hereinafter DECEPTIVE PRACTICES 2.0].
105 E-DECEPTIVE, supra note 1, at 5 (citing ELECTION PROT., REPORT ON THE LEGAL
PROGRAM TO BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND TRUSTEES, STAFF, AND PRO BONO PARTNERS (2006),
available at http://www.866ourvote.org/tools/publications_testimony/files/0003.pdf).
106 Thomas Frank & Richard Wolf, Pranks, Mischief Reach Higher Level at Colleges, USA
TODAY, Nov. 5, 2008, at 10A; Brian Krebs, GMU E-Mail Hoax: Election Day Moved to Nov. 5,
WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2008, 10:16 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2008/
11/gmu_e-mail_hoax_election_day_m.html.
107 See E-DECEPTIVE, supra note 1, at 5.
108 DECEPTIVE PRACTICES 2.0, supra note 104, at 5.
109 Id. at 5–8, 11, 14–15, 18–22.
110 MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 752.794 (LexisNexis 2011).
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deliver advertising targeted to the individual consumer’s interests.”111  This definition
excludes “first party” advertising where no data is shared with third parties and con-
textual advertising, which is targeting based on a user’s single visit to a single web
page.112  Contextual advertising is to be construed very narrowly—if information is
collected and stored for use at a later time, it is no longer contextual advertising.113
Further, the FTC found that personally identifiable information (PII) is becom-
ing an increasingly expansive category of data.114  PII, which links individual con-
sumers to data about online activities, can include wi-fi information, IP addresses,
Social Security numbers, and passwords.115  The FTC proposed four principles for self-
regulation of online behavioral targeting, especially when PII data is being collected. 
The principles include, 1) transparency and control, 2) “reasonable security and lim-
ited data retention,” 3) “affirmative express consent from affected consumers” before
material changes are made to privacy policies, and 4) “affirmative express consent”
from the consumer when companies plan to use sensitive data for their advertising.116
Enforcement of these principles, the FTC notes, requires industry to do much
more to limit the use of PII and the invasiveness of behavioral tracking.117  “Meaning-
ful enforcement mechanisms” should be the goal of all industry.118  The report states,
“Self-regulation can work only if concerned industry members actively monitor com-
pliance and ensure that violations have consequences.”119  Industry self-regulation may
have little impact on unscrupulous individuals who are able to buy a company’s data
on consumers and use that information to suppress voter participation in an election.
The amount of PII circulating on the Internet facilitates the building of profiles of
voters for whom targeted political messages can be built and directed.120  Advertisers
and political campaigns often draw on the same types of data to create profiles that
illuminate the different aspects of individual lives and identities, including military
active duty status, property ownership, and employment status.121
Campaigns collect this data from voter registration applications,
voters’ history of participation, state-issued professional licenses,
111 FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE
BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 46 (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/P085400
behavadreport.pdf [hereinafter FTC REPORT].
112 Id. at 26.
113 See id. at 30.
114 Id. at 22–23; see also An Interview with David Vladeck of the F.T.C., N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 5, 2009, 2:24 AM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/05/an-interview
-with-david-vladeck-of-the-ftc/.
115 See FTC REPORT, supra note 111, at 20–22 & n.47.
116 Id. at 46–47 (capitalization omitted).
117 See id. at 47.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 See E-DECEPTIVE, supra note 1, at 9.
121 See id.
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and low-level elected office holders.  Profiles are used to de-
velop expectations regarding the behavior of individuals based
on their activities, preferences for a wide range of products and
services, personal associations, religious beliefs, past political par-
ticipation, type of work, neighborhood, place of birth, and level
of education.122
Until recently, Virginia had limited access to voter information, including PII and
history of participation in elections, only to “elected officials, candidates and party
chairmen.”123  A court decision found that this state law was unconstitutional under
the theory that it limited free expression and violated equal protection of the law prin-
ciples.124  The court left undecided whether the information, which the plaintiffs in-
tended to use to target individual voters with their history of election participation as
a means of pushing them to the polls, could also be used to let people other than the
voter know their record of participation.125  “Few voters are aware of how much infor-
mation about the details of their lives is in the hands of third parties.”126
Greater influxes of cash into elections enable campaigns to drill down into voter
interests and new businesses to develop which work under the model of providing the
most individualized and expansive lists of voters for targeted messaging.127  Profiles of
consumer behavior are often predictive of future behavior—these profiles are bought
and sold between retailers, advertisers, and increasingly, data brokers who may sell
the profiles to campaigns.128  These profiles are often easily linked with the Internet
122 Id. (citing Bob Blaemire, Campaigns and Voter Profiles, C-SPAN (Dec. 29, 2009),
available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/290960-3).
123 Bill Sizemore, Judge Expands Access to Virginians’ Voting Records, VIRGINIA-PILOT,
(Feb. 17, 2011), http://hamptonroads.com/2011/02/judges-ruling-expands-access-virginians
-voting-records.
124 Id.
125 See id.
126 E-DECEPTIVE, supra note 1, at 9 (citing T.W. Farnam & Dan Eggen, Interest-Group
Spending for Midterm Up Fivefold From 2006; Many Sources Secret, WASH. POST, Oct. 4,
2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/03/AR201010030
3664.html).
127 See id. at 9–10 (citing Thomas Fitzgerald, Parties Pin Hopes on Voter Profiling,
BRADENTON HERALD, Nov. 2, 2006, at 3; Michael D. Shear, Va. Gubernatorial Candidates
Use Data to Zero In on Voters, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2005, at C1; Jacqui Cheng, Government
Relies on Facebook ‘Narcissism’ to Spot Fake Marriages, Fraud, ARS TECHNICA, http://
arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/10/govt-takes-advantage-of-facebook-narcissism-to
-check-on-users.ars (last visited Apr. 10, 2011); Voter Vault, FILPAC, http://www.filpac
.com/votervault.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2011)).
128 See id. at 10 (citing Press Release, Markey, Barton Release Responses from Web Sites
on Their Tracking of Consumer Behavior (Oct. 8, 2010), http://markey.house.gov/index.php
?option=content&task=view&id=4103&Itemid=125; Behavioral Targeting to Grow: The
Mixing and Mining of Audience Data Becomes More Important to Advertisers, ADWEEK
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Protocol (IP) address of the device used to make a purchase, sign a petition, or access
a social networking site, making the user personally identifiable.129
As EPIC noted in its recent report, the 2008 Presidential Election marked the first
time that campaign strategists turned to behavioral targeting and micro-targeting to
build their voter profiles.130  EPIC drew attention to two companies, TargetPoint
Consulting and Aristotle.131  Target Point markets its micro-targeting as a tool “that
helps to answer their [customers’] most fundamental questions: Who supports my
candidate?  Where do I find them?  How do I persuade others to support my candidate? 
When should I talk to them?  Who should my messenger be?”132  Aristotle, the other
company highlighted by EPIC, has worked with “[e]very occupant of the White House”
for over twenty-five years, and provides voter matching services that allow campaigns
to “select and target only the voters [they] need by targeting individuals through a
comprehensive selection of demographics including but not limited to: political dis-
trict, political party affiliation, Super-voters, gender, ethnicity, marital status, wealth,
educational level and presence of children.”133
Internet users are slowly becoming aware of how much of their online activity
is being monitored and legislators are increasingly making efforts to address their
constituents’ concerns about this tracking.134  Recall Senator Rockefeller’s questions
(Feb. 28, 2010), http://www.adweek.com/aw/content_display/news/digital/e3iccd499946ba0
cc761fcc25e25943c52e; Jennifer Slegg, What’s the Buzz Behind Behavioral Advertising,
SEARCH ENGINE WATCH (May 11, 2006), http://searchenginewatch.com/3605361).
129 See E-DECEPTIVE, supra note 1, at 10; Scott Thurm & Yukari Iwatani Kane, Your Apps
are Watching You, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424
052748704694004576020083703574602.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTTopStories &om_rid=
DlFZ0L&om_mid=_BNDMpyB8WhYZdB#articleTabs%3Darticle.
130 Id. (citing Thomas Fitzgerald, Profiling is Key to ‘06 Turnout: Campaigns are Mining
Consumer Data for Votes, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 29, 2006, at A1; Heather Green, The Candi-
dates are Monitoring Your Mouse, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS WEEK (Aug. 28, 2008, 5:00 PM),
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_36/b4098022877194.htm).
131 Id. at 10–11.
132 Id. at 10; see also MicroTargeting, TARGETPOINT, http://www.targetpointconsulting
.com/system/uploads/14/original/MicroTargeting_101_8-2009.pdf?1249570076 (last visited
Apr. 10, 2011). The company provides a “data-rich resource to guide a campaign’s strategic
decision-making.” To The Point: 4 Ways Data can Change Campaigns, TARGETPOINT
(Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.targetpointconsulting.com/ToThePoint/2010/08/25/4-ways-location
-data-can-change-campaigns.
133 E-DECEPTIVE, supra note 1, at 11; About Aristotle, ARISTOTLE, http://www.aristotle
.com/content/blogsection/8/72 (last visited Apr. 10, 2011); VoterListsOnline.com, ARISTOTLE,
http://www.aristotle.com/content/view/35/119 (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
134 See Behavioral Advertising: Industry Practices And Consumers’ Expectations: Hearing
before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot. and the Subcomm. on
Commc’ns, Tech., and the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong.
(2010) (statement of Jeffrey Chester, Exec. Dir., Ctr. For Digital Democracy); Press Release,
Report Reveals Consumer Awareness About BT (Mar. 26, 2008), http://www.truste.com/about
_TRUSTe/press-room/news_truste_consumer_awareness_report.html.
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referenced above: “Can consumers demand the same degree of anonymity on the
Internet that they have in a shopping mall?”135  The Federal Trade Commission and
the Commerce Department recently published reports calling for increased privacy
protections for Internet users.136  Members of the House are putting forth bills to pro-
tect privacy, including “Do Not Track” legislation.137  The Senate Judiciary committee
has created a new subcommittee focused on privacy and the relationship between the
individual and the private sector, with jurisdiction over areas including the privacy
implications of emerging technologies.138  These efforts reflect awareness of the need
to protect the privacy of Internet users and may also provide ways to think about ad-
dressing voter suppression activity that occurs when users’ privacy is compromised
and used to create profiles based on Internet use.
Political organizations, both grassroots and dominant parties, ought to develop
privacy policies about the use of voter information they have collected during the
process of getting out the vote, registering voters, and fund-raising.  In the 2010 mid-
term election, Organizing for America, the group which grew out of President Obama’s
2008 presidential campaign, created a virtual phone bank.139  The virtual phone bank
provided volunteers helping to get out the vote with detailed information about voters,
including name, sex, phone number, city of residence, and address.140  Volunteers
called people on the list to urge them to get out and vote.  The problem was the lack of
privacy protections built into this virtual phone bank.141  Anyone who had a computer
and could access the Internet, could view this detailed information about voters.142 
Potential volunteers did not have to register or provide any personal information in
order to access the data.143
Many conservative activists, took advantage of this easy access to use the listings
for their own ends.144  Rubin Stublen explains, “I just called and asked them to vote
135 Hearing, Rockefeller, supra note 11.
136 See COMMERCE DEP’T, COMMERCIAL DATA PRIVACY AND INNOVATION IN THE INTERNET
ECONOMY: A DYNAMIC POLICY FRAMEWORK (2010), available at http://ntia.doc.gov/reports
/2010/IPTF_Privacy_GreenPaper_12162010.pdf; FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CON-
SUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS AND
POLICYMAKERS (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf.
137 See David Sarno, ‘Do Not Track’ Internet Privacy Bill Introduced in House, L.A. TIMES
(Feb. 11, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/11/business/la-fi-do-not-track-20110212.
138 See Cecilia Kang, Senate Judiciary Names Franken Head of New Privacy, Tech
Subcommittee, WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2011, 4:34 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com
/posttech/2011/02/senate_judiciary_names_franken.html.
139 Sandhya Somashekhar, Conservatives Use Democratic Phone Bank for Own Purposes,
Raise Privacy Concerns, WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2010, 9:47 AM) http://www.washingtonpost
.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/01/AR2010110102265.html?hpid=topnews.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
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for the conservative candidate who was in their area . . . .  You don’t have to log on and
you can get the numbers.  I mean, duh.”145  Another conservative activist urged readers
to sabotage the Organizing for America’s get-out-the-vote effort by pretending to call
people on the list but then claim that the voters were deceased or had voted early.146
This virtual phone bank example shows the need for enhanced privacy policies as
well as illustrates the difficulties discussed earlier of defining deceptive practices and
potentially creating legislation that would penalize such activities.  The opportunity
for advertisers to drill down to the individual interests of particular consumers pre-
sents a similar opportunity for activists to target a deceptive campaign at particular
audiences.  The vulnerability of these audiences suggests that strategies for enhanc-
ing digital literacy be designed, the necessity of more stringent regulation of online
behavioral advertising, and the adoption of federal and state laws which address de-
ceptive campaign tactics.  Voter suppression will become an increasingly potent way
to thwart people’s active participation in the electoral process.  Unless the law evolves
to incorporate both civil and criminal penalties for voter suppression, many vulnerable
voters will lose the opportunity to have their voices heard.
145 Id. In contrast to the ease of access to information in the Organizing for America phone
bank, the Republic National Committee required volunteers to register on its website before
making a call. The information provided volunteers was limited to the name and state of the
voters being called and the call itself was routed through the volunteers’ computers, effectively
masking the phone numbers of both volunteer and voter. Id.
146 Id.
